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RECENT DECISIONS

TAXATION - CONSTITUTIONAL OBJECTIONS TO RELEASE OF DELINQUENT TAXES AND ACCRUED PENALTIES THEREON - In 1933, the Ohio
legislature passed an act exempting from taxation certain property of interurban
railway companies for a period of three years from January 1, 1932, and a sub~equent act in 1935 extended the exemption for two more years.1 Relator, a
taxpayer, sought by mandamus to compel the state tax commission to collect the
taxes for all the years in question. Held, the act was unconstitutional as applied
to the 1932 taxes already assessed because it violated a provision of the state
constitution forbidding retroactive laws. 2 State ex rel. Struble v. Dtl'lJis, 132 Ohio
St. 555, 9 N. E. (2d) 684 (1937), 135 Ohio St. 393, 22 N. E. (2d) 81
(1939).
The great increase of tax delinquency during the depression has led to
numerous legislative attempts to speed tax collection by discharging the burden
of accrued penalties, interest and costs on delinquent taxes and, in some cases,
by releasing the delinquent taxes themselves. 8 Several constitutional objections
to such legislation have been raised. Constitutional provisions forbidding retrQactive laws do not bar the discharge of accrued penalties.4 Where this type of

115 Ohio Laws 546 (1933); 116 Ohio Laws 26 (1935).
Ohio Const. (1851), art. 2, § 28. Similar provisions are in the constitutions of
Colorado, Georgia, Missouri, New Hampshire, Tennessee and Texas.
8 On the problem in general, see Simpson, "Tax Delinquency: Economic Aspects,"
and Baker, "Tax Delinquency: Legal Aspects," 28 ILL. L. REV. 147, 159 (1933);
Symposium on collection of real property taxes, 3 LAW & CoNTEM. PRoB. 335-461
(1936); FoRD, REALTY TAX DELINQUENCY IN MICHIGAN (1937) (Univ. Mich.
Bureau of Govt. Bul. No. 8, N. S.). For a collection of typical legislation, see Smith,
"Recent Legislative Indulgences to Delinquent Taxpayers," 3 LAw & CoNTEM. PRoB.
371 (1936).
4 In State ex rel. Outcault v. Guckenberger, 134 Ohio St. 457, 17 N. E. (2d)
743 (1938), the court allowed a discharge of accrued penalties and distinguished a
prior decision, State ex rel. Crotty v. Zangerle, 133 Ohio St. 532, 14 N. E. (2d) 932
1

2
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provision alone is involved, it is difficult to see why delinquent taxes also cannot be released. 11 Constitutional provisions forbidding laws which release obligations due the state or its subdivisions 6 have been held to invalidate laws releasing delinquent taxes,7 but courts hold that penalties are not "obligations" within
the meaning of these provisions. 8 Constitutional prohibitions against refund of
penalties and fines by local and special laws do not prevent their discharge by
general laws. 9 Even where a constitution expressly forbids release or commutation of taxes, accrued penalties may be discharged.10 Arguments based on impairment of contract or of vested rights have little force as objections to either
ruscharge of penalties or release of delinquent taxes.11 Constitutional requirements
of equal protection of law and of uniformity in valuation for taxation do not
prevent the discharge of accrued penalties.12 However, these provisions are
(1938), which held unconstitutional a law refunding penalties already paid on the
ground that it was retroactive. The distinction does not seem clear, since the laws
involved were parts of the same general plan. See dissenting opinion of Gorman, J.,
in the Zangerle case and comment in 4 OHIO &r. L. J. 191 (1938).
11 In Demoville v. Davidson County, 87 Tenn. 214, IO S. W. 353 (1889), and
Bank of Commerce & Trust Co. v. McLemore, 162 Tenn. 137, 35 S. W. (2d) 31
(1931), the court held that a similar provision, Tenn. Const. (1870), art. I, § 20, did
not prevent the state from releasing taxes by retroactive laws. Retroactive conferring of
benefits may be distinguished from retroactive imposition of burdens. See Smith,
"Retroactive Laws and Vested Rights," 5 TEX. L. REV. 231 (1927).
6 Such provisions are found in constitutions of Colorado, Illinois, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Missouri, Montana,- Nebraska, New Mexico, Texas and Wyoming.
7
Louisville v. Louisville Ry., II 1 Ky. 1, 63 S. W. 14 (1901) (attempt by city
to compromise a tax claim); Graham Paper Co. v. Gehner, 332 Mo. 155, 59 S. W.
(2d) 49 (1933) (income tax not yet due is an obligation within this provision). The
court in Asplund v. Alarid, 29 N. M. 129, 219 P. 786 (1923), held a subsequent
amendment giving the legislature power to make certain tax exemptions constituted
an exception to the existing constitutional prohibition on releasing obligations due the
state.
8
State ex rel. Crutcher v. Koeln, 332 Mo. 1229, 61 S. W. (2d) 750 (1933);
Jones v. Williams, 121 Tex. 94, 45 S. W. (2d) 130 (1931) (penalties not prosecuted
. to judgment may be discharged); State ex rel. Sparling v. Hitsman, 99 Mont. 521,
44 P. (2d) 747 (1935) (two prior cases overruled and excellent consideration of
·authorities presented).
9 See cases in note 8, supra. In People ex rel. Clarke v. Jarecki, 363 111. 180, l
N. E. (2d) 855 (1936), a law discharging penalties in Cook County alone was held
invalid on this ground.
10 Steinacher v. Swanson, 131 Neb. 439, 268 N. W. 317 (1936); Neb. Const,·
(1875), art. 8, § 4.
11 In State ex rel. McKittrick v. Bair, 333 Mo. 1, 63 S. W. (2d) 64 (i933),
the court held that a county tax collector and his attorneys had no vested contract right
to compensation from penalties for collection of delinquent taxes. Henry v. · McKay,
.164 Wash. 526, 3 P. (2d) 145 (1931), held that the state could release any vested
rights it had in existing penalty rates.
12 Penalties are held not part of the tax burden, hence not subject to the uniformity rule. State ex rel. Pierce v. Coos County, II5 Ore. 300, 237 P. 678 (1925);
State ex rel. Outcault v. Guckenberger, 134 Ohio St. 457, 17 N. E. (2d) 743 (1938).
The Illinois court in People ex rel. Clarke v. Jarecki, 363 111. 180, l N. E. (2d) 855
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usually a serious obstacle to laws releasing or compromising delinquent taxes.1 8
The general distinctions between releasing delinquent taxes and discharging
accrued penalties seem valid.1~ The result in the principal case is in line with
general authority, but the decision could have rested on stronger constitutional
limitations than the prohibition against retroactive laws.

(1936), held that the release of accrued interest violated the constitutional provision
for uniform taxation on valuation, as the interest varied with the valuation.
18 Classification on the basis of speed of payment alone has been held arbitrary and
a denial of the equal protection of law to persons paying their taxes on time. State
ex rel. Matteson v. Luecke, 194 Minn. 246, 260 N. W. 206 (1935); Ranger Realty
Co. v. Miller, 102 Fla. 378, 136 So. 546 (1931); Ritchie v. Wells, 123 Fla. 284, 166
So. 817 (1936). Both courts stated that classification on the basis of ability of the
property owner to pay and the proportional value that the property bore to the delinquent taxes would be constitutional. It is submitted that, while this reasoning is a
departure from the general theory of the property tax, it may be justified on grounds
of social and economic necessity.
u Penalties are designed to enforce and encourage prompt payment of taxes, not
to be steady sources of revenue. The legislature should be able to change the inducements to payment when it finds that existing systems do not produce results.

